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Nowak et al.1 wish to explain why the version of kin selection theory that is 
summarised by the formula R>c/b (c=cost of performing ‘altruistic’ act, b=benefit 
derived by recipient of act, R=relatedness between the two) is of little utility for 
understanding the evolution of eusociality. But in trying to do so they omit much 
that is relevant and risk misrepresenting the issue to anyone who is not familiar with 
the literature. A fairer account would include the following facts.  
 
(1) Darwin said much more than implied by Nowak et al. He did regard the sterile 
worker caste in ants as one might a “well-flavoured vegetable [that] is destroyed”2 
and whose variety can be regenerated by sowing seeds from the same stock - an 
analogy that embodies the essence of kin selection. However, he did not stop at 
that. He added “..natural selection, by acting on the fertile parents, could form a 
species which should regularly produce neuters”2. This, an analogy to the roles of 
the germ line and soma, is a possibility also advocated by Nowak et al. Elsewhere 
he pointed out that those members of a tribe who “...were always ready to aid one 
another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good”, would leave behind 
fewer children than other members of the tribe but the tribe itself “..would be 
victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection”3 – 
essentially the same hypothesis that was investigated by Haldane4 and Wright5, 
namely that within-group selection against ‘altruists’ could be counterbalanced by 
between-group selection that favoured groups with altruists disproportionately. In 
short, Darwin did not confine himself to a single explanation for the evolution of 
social behaviour. 
(2) Fisher6 too, and not only Haldane, pointed out that a trait that is detrimental to its 
bearer (e.g., warning colouration) can spread by natural selection if its expression 
favours the survival of others who share genes with the bearer by common 
descent.  
(3) Surprisingly, Nowak et al. ignore the abundant literature on social behaviour in 
microorganisms. Much of it relates directly to their central contention. For 
example, both clonal7 and multi-clonal8 groups of cellular slime mould amoebae 
exist in nature. Some amoebae within the group sporulate and the rest die; 
laboratory experiments9, 10 show that genetic heterogeneity can exert a significant 
non-linear effect on the relative sporulation efficiencies of different genotypes. 
Irrespective of the level of genetic relatedness within a group, social behaviour 
can be interpreted as the outcome of selection between different autonomously 
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generated phenotypes11. Experiments with bacterial social groups show similar 
non-linear effects12, 13 and point to the importance of demography and group 
effects as mediators of social behaviour. In both cases indices of ‘altruism’ are 
insensitive to genetic relatedness.  
(4) Readers who do not go through the Supplementary Material that is provided on-
line may not realise that it was G. E. Price14 who provided a general quantitative 
treatment for the evolution of a trait by natural selection acting at the individual 
level. His formulation emphasised that selection acts on phenotypes and that it is 
useful to think of selection and transmission as separate components of change15. 
It accommodated kin selection as a special case and showed that Hamilton’s 
‘relatedness’ R was a special case too – of a coefficient of regression.  
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